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Abstract
The evolution in animals of a first possession convention, in which individuals retain what
they are the first to acquire, has often been taken as a foundation for the evolution of human
ownership institutions. However, among humans, individuals actually only seldom retain
an item they have acquired from the environment, instead typically transferring what they
possess to other members of the community, to those in command, or to those who hold a
contractual title. This paper presents a novel game-theoretic model of the evolution of own-
ership institutions as rules governing resource transfers. Integrating existing findings, the
model contributes a new perspective on the emergence of communal transfers among
hominin large game hunters around 200,000 years ago, of command ownership among
sedentary humans in the millennia prior to the transition to agriculture, and of titled property
ownership around 5,500 years ago. Since today’s property institutions motivate transfers
through the promise of future returns, the analysis presented here suggests that these insti-
tutions may be placed under considerable pressure should resources become significantly
constrained.
Introduction
One of the earliest applications of evolutionary game theory was to model how nonhuman
animals signalling an intent to defend territory prevents wasteful conflict within groups [1, 2],
and a ‘first possession’ convention is sometimes taken as the basis for human ownership insti-
tutions [3–7]. However, among humans, resource items are usually not retained by their first
possessor but are transferred to others. These transfers are governed by different ownership
rules (see Fig 1): under the ‘communal’ ownership norms that evolved among hunters of large
game resources are transferred to other group members; under the ‘command’ ownership typ-
ical of hierarchical sedentary societies resources are transferred to those of higher status; and
under ‘titled property’ ownership resources are transferred to the holder of a legal title to those
resources.
The need for a clearer understanding of the mechanisms by which a society’s institutions
change alongside its resource base has been noted by researchers across disciplines [8–11]. In
evolutionary terms, the general question addressed in this paper can be stated as: Why do dif-
ferent ownership institutions survive to govern different resource types? Stated more specifi-
cally: Why did ‘communal’ ownership norms evolve among hunters of large game? Why did







Citation: Hartley T (2019) The continuing evolution
of ownership. PLoS ONE 14(2): e0211871. https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211871
Editor: Baogui Xin, Shandong University of Science
and Technology, CHINA
Received: June 7, 2018
Accepted: January 23, 2019
Published: February 12, 2019
Copyright: © 2019 Tilman Hartley. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper.
Funding: The author received no specific funding
for this work.
Competing interests: The author has declared that
no competing interests exist.
persistent ‘command’ ownership tend to survive among sedentary societies? And in what con-
ditions have contractual ‘titled property’ ownership institutions historically survived?
In the next section, the model is outlined and the results and predictions are set out. This
provides a heuristic for an examination of the existing empirical evidence for the evolution of
communal, command, and titled property institutions. This is followed by a ‘Discussion’ sec-
tion in which the main similarities and differences between this and other models, as well as
the model’s main limitations, are discussed. A short ‘Conclusion’ summarises the contribu-
tions that this paper makes to the literature. At the end of the paper, a ‘Methods’ section sets
out the model in full.
An evolutionary game theory model: Results and predictions
The model builds on the intuition that each individual can either obtain some resource item
from the environment or can demand some resource item from someone else; and that an
individual who has obtained a resource from the environment can either surrender it upon
demand or can resist such demands. This yields three discrete strategies: a Demander demands
resources from others and fights if necessary; a Resister obtains a resource from the environ-
ment and fights to defend it if necessary; and a Transferrer obtains a resource from the envi-
ronment but surrenders it if demanded. Five parameters determine the strategy payoffs (see
Table 1).
Though some forms of institutionalism take institutions to be exogenous, the explicitly evo-
lutionary approach taken here interprets institutions as selected from a diversity of possibili-
ties, and evolving as the result of a change in a given population of individuals [12, 13].
Individuals adopt different strategies with regard to the acquisition, retention, and transfer of
Fig 1. Four ownership institutions governing the retention or transfer of resource items. Foraged foods tend to be retained by their first possessor, whilst under
communal ownership norms items are transferred to others in the group; under command ownership items are transferred to those of higher status, whilst under titled
property items are transferred to the holder of legal title. ‘A troop of olive baboons’ photo reprinted under a CC BY license with permission from Amanda Lea, original
copyright 2009; cave art after San rock painting in the Drakensberg Mountains; Aztec ritual after an extract from the Codex Magliabechiano; New York Stock
Exchange image is in the public domain.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211871.g001
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items, and population change occurs as individuals playing the more fitness enhancing strate-
gies increase as a proportion of the population [14]. Different values for the five variables
therefore lead to different mixes of strategies in the population. An ‘evolutionary stable’ out-
come occurs when a given set of parameter values results in a population playing one or more
strategies can prevent ‘invasion’ by those playing a different strategy. The model yields three
sets of conditions in which three evolutionary stable outcomes result (see Fig 2).
As summarised in Fig 2, the model results yield predictions for the conditions in which
‘communal’, ‘command’, and ‘titled property’ institutions will tend to survive in a population.
These predictions provide a heuristic for an examination, in the next section, of the circum-
stances in which different ownership institutions have evolved and survived. First possession
is predicted to survive as long as 0< (1 − P)v − f − c, which could be rewritten as f + c< (1 −
P)v; that is, first possession survives as long as the net increase in fitness that accrues to Resist-
ers after their losses to Demanders ((1 − P)v) is greater than the fitness costs of obtaining and
defending (c + f) the resource. Correspondingly, a shift away from first possession is predicted
Table 1. Payoff matrix for the Demander-Resister-Transferrer game.
Demand Resist Transfer
Demand 0 Pv − f v
Resist (1 − P)v − f − c v − c v − c
Transfer b − c v − c v − c
Payoffs are to the row player (on the left). Consuming a resource item increases an individual’s fitness (by a value v),
but there is a fitness reducing cost to obtaining it from the environment (c). There are costs to both Demanders and
Resisters when they fight (f for both). Transferrers may receive some benefit when they make a transfer (b). The
proportion of conflicts won by Demanders when they fight against Resisters is the fifth and final variable of the
model (P).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211871.t001
Fig 2. The three game outcomes. Three evolutionary stable outcomes can result: a population dominated by Resisters; one where Demanders and Transferrers co-
exist; or one where Demanders dominate.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211871.g002
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when 0< (1 − P)v − f − c no longer holds; if, alongside this condition, the fitness costs of
obtaining a resource is greater than the benefits of transferring, so that c> b, then the popula-
tion is predicted to be dominated by Demanders, but probably only quite briefly since no
resources are being acquired by anyone in such a population.
The population will not become dominated by Demanders, however, as long as there are
sufficient benefits to making transfers, relative to the costs of resource acquisition, to maintain
b> c; in that case, a mixed Demander-Transferrer population results, corresponding to a com-
munal, command, or titled property institution. The transition to communal ownership, then,
is predicted to occur when there are increases in the costs of fighting between group members
(f), which might occur with the development of better hunting tools which can also be used as
weapons, and when there are sufficient increases in the fitness benefits of transferring to others
(b) in relation to the costs of acquiring resources from the environment (c), such as when sus-
taining other group members provides sufficient benefits in the form of collective defence or a
reduction in the unpredictability of the food supply. It is predicted that communal ownership
institutions will no longer be maintained if it becomes more costly to hunt, for example as
large game declines, or if there are fewer benefits of sustaining other group members, as then
the inequality b> c may no longer hold; a Demand dominated population may briefly occur.
Alternatively, command ownership is predicted to survive where 0> (1 − P)v − f − c and
b> c which may occur where, for example, those demanding resources are sufficiently likely
to win resource conflicts as this reduces the net fitness of Resisters, and where the benefits of
group defence remains high relative to cost of resource acquisition, for example if conflict
between groups escalates so that the defensive benefits of group membership remain high.
Finally, titled property ownership emerges as a means to ensure that individuals receive a
benefit from transferring what they have previously acquired, so that the inequality b> c holds
both for those who transfer resources in expectation of receiving a return as well as for those
without inherited wealth who can acquire resources for investment. This prevents a return to a
first possession institution by ensuring individual benefits to transferring resources, as well as
both the incentives and an investment mechanism for a society to obtain increasing amounts
of resources.
The evolution of communal, command, and titled property
ownership
Proceeding roughly chronologically, in this section I will examine evidence for the circum-
stances in which communal, command, and titled property ownership institutions emerged
and survived, situating the model in existing debates around these institutional developments.
Big game hunting and communal ownership
Inferences for the way in which communal ownership may have evolved amongst hominins
has been drawn from the behaviour of other social carnivores, of nonhuman primates, and of
extant hunter-gatherer groups. About 3.5 million years ago species of canid, felid, and primate
social carnivores emerged to fill the ecological niches created by sunnier drier conditions [15].
Since most terrestrial mammalian carnivores are solitary, increased sociality is thought to have
evolved as a derived trait where group life increases individual fitness, including through col-
lective defence and, particularly in species that hunt large game, through the acquisition of
more resources [15, 16]. However, competition over food is typically sufficiently intense to dis-
rupt grouping behaviour, and most social carnivores are therefore structured by fission-fusion
dynamics in which groups break up in times of scarcity and reassemble when food is abundant
[17, 18]. Though some species of nonhuman primate share rare or difficult to process foods
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with weaned offspring, and in some of these species there is also sharing between adults in
mating or defensive coalitions, among nonhuman primates systematic sharing between non-
kin is rare [19]. More commonly observed among nonhuman primates is an increased tolera-
tion for the scrounging or taking of food, particularly when the initial possessor has large fruits
or large quantities of meat that it would be difficult to defend against others, though foods of
such large package size do not typically constitute a large proportion of their diet [8, 19, 20].
Among human hunter-gatherers, however, active food sharing is ubiquitous [8, 19, 21]. It
is thought that widespread sharing beyond kin allows a larger group to be maintained, the
benefits of which includes collective defence against predators and a reduction in the unpre-
dictability of the food supply, often called ‘variance reduction’ [8, 22, 23]. In terms of the
model, these are fitness enhancing benefits (b) of transferring resources to others in the
group. Though hominin meat consumption dates to at least 2.5 million years ago [24] and
the hunting of small bovids and persistent carnivory from scavenging or hunting to around 2
million years ago [25, 26], the earliest evidence for large animal hunting is much later, fol-
lowing physiological changes that allowed accurate overhead throwing, as well as the capacity
for speech which may have allowed greater collective coordination. The development of
tools for large game hunting are also thought to have massively increased the costs of fighting
(f) between group members wielding those tools as weapons [27]. By around 250,000 years
ago large game had become a prominent component of human subsistence [25], and around
200,000 years ago the earliest evidence is found for butchery of large animals by a single
butcher [28]. These hominin hunters of large game appear to have peaceably taken carcasses
back to central places to be divided and shared among other members of the group. This
marks a distinction between the behaviour of humans and that of other primates who do
not take meat from the kill to provision others who are absent [27, 29, 30]. Among human
hunter-gatherers, successful hunters typically neither claim ownership of what they have
acquired nor control any aspect of its distribution [8, 19, 21]. For example, among the Netsi-
lik Eskimo twelve of the fourteen portions cut from a seal are distributed to a network of
meat-sharing partners deliberately chosen during childhood to be outside the existing close
relationships of the hunter [31, 32]; among the !Kung of the Kalahari the distributor of the
meat is chosen on the basis that their arrow was the first to hit the animal, but since arrows
are regularly exchanged between hunters this is often not the hunter who took the shot, and
may even be someone not present at the time [21]; and among the Ache of Paraguay it was
long considered taboo for a hunter to eat portions of their kills, and meat distribution is still
usually undertaken by an older man in the group [22].
Sedentism, stratification, and command ownership
Though archaeological evidence suggests sporadic experiments with institutional inequality as
long as 29,000 years ago, stratification seems to have become more permanent only much later
among more sedentary societies [33]. Theories of the evolution of institutional stratification
include narratives of both the beneficial and the coercive aspects of hierarchical societies [34].
The coercive aspects are thought to have become easier to sustain in sedentary societies where
some people prevent others from accessing resources [35]; though the value of resources (v)
may increase relative to the costs of acquiring them from the environment (c) and the costs
of fighting (f), a return to a first possession institution can nevertheless be avoided if those
demanding resources are sufficiently likely to win resource conflicts (P). Meanwhile, the bene-
fits of some level of stratification might include the creation of role models, the provision of
dispute resolution, a division of labour, and the collective punishment of free-riders [36–41].
These benefits, however, do not differ greatly from those of belonging to a mildly stratified
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hunter-gatherer society, a similarity that perhaps helps explain why the relatively egalitarian
institutions of horticulturalists tend to resemble those of hunter-gatherers [42].
Beginning around 15,000 years ago, the archaeological record shows the start of what has
become known as the ‘quaternary extinction’, a period in which many species of larger animals
became extinct [43–45]. The model suggests that if such a decline leads to it becoming more
costly to hunt and there being fewer benefits of sustaining other group members, the benefits
of transferring resources may become less that the costs of obtaining them in the first place
(c> b) and so communal ownership institutions may no longer be maintained. Groups may
briefly become dominated by those who demand resources from others, or fission as other
social carnivores do when competition for food becomes too intense [17, 18] as occurs in a
Demand-dominated population in the model. During periods of scarcity, several hunter-gath-
erer groups who practice no cultivation whatsoever define areas within which individuals for-
age for low value resources, resources that hunter-gatherers typically do not share beyond
immediate family [46, 47]. This shift in behaviour is well documented amongst groups such as
those of the American northeast and the!Kung, who seasonally switch from a pattern of com-
munal living in the summer where game is large and plentiful to a system of separate plots in
the winter when game is small and when noncultivated plants provide a more important con-
tribution to the diet [47, 48]. Periods of abundance occurred even less frequently for the Sho-
shone of Nevada, with tribes fissioning into separate multi-family camps and often remaining
isolated for years at a time [47, 49]. It may be that a similar process occurred after the decline
of large game during the Late Quaternary.
In western Asia, beginning around 12,800 years ago, clusters of small huts each probably
housing a nuclear family appear in the archaeological record [50]. This non-agricultural but
largely sedentary Natufian culture already shows signs of some social stratification in the form
of differences in height, grave goods, and housing, though both sedentism and stratification
disappeared during the more variable climatic conditions of the Younger Dryas from around
12,900 to 11,600 years ago [51–53]. With the return of a more stable climate, sedentary settle-
ments returned to western Asia [54]. By around 10,000 years ago, the early occupants of Abu
Hureya in Syria lived in sedentary clusters of five to seven small houses, gathering wild rye,
wild barley, two kinds of wild wheat and hunting, mostly gazelles; two thousand years later,
occupants of the same site harvested domesticated wheat and barley and herded domesticated
sheep and goats [32, 55]. Though in western Asia, China, Japan, and northwestern Peru per-
manent settlements are thought to have preceded cultivation often by millennia, in India,
Africa, and north America such settlements may have only emerged after the process of
domestication was already well under way [56–58]. Despite this diversity of pathways, across
all sites paleobotanic evidence suggests that the rate at which wild plants were domesticated is
comparable to the rate at which variation in wild varieties occur, suggesting that domesticates
resulted from hundreds or thousands of years of selection pressure by at least seasonally- or
semi-sedentary humans [56].
In the light of recent ethnographic and archaeological evidence, the popular theory that
domestication was delayed until the creation of an institution of individual land ownership
[59–61] is no longer so strongly supported [46]. Though ethnographic examples have some-
times been drawn upon to suggest that a lack of the appropriate ownership institutions may
have been an impediment to the transition to agriculture, these examples are of mobile
hunter-gatherers such the Hadza of Tanzania, the Batek of Malaysia, the !Kung, and the Hiwi
of Venezuela, groups that normally obtain a large proportion of their diet from hunting and
who actively maintain communal ownership [46, 61]. Indeed, recent ethnographic studies sug-
gest that the institutions of extant low level horticulturalists far more closely resemble the
more egalitarian practices of hunter-gatherers than the institutions of agriculturalists or
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pastoralists [42], and even among agriculturalists cases can be found in which communal own-
ership persisted in societies with a high dependence on domesticates, such as the Natchez of
the American southwest who managed the entire crop as a communal effort and shared the
produce [47].
Though land ownership may not have been a prerequisite for domestication, some level of
sedentism has historically allowed wealth, power, and status to be accumulated not only by
individuals, but by lineages [62]. This increases the likelihood (represented in the model by P)
that these powerful elites will win any conflicts with those who acquire resources from the
environment, and thus prevents a return to a first possession institution. Even in nonagricul-
tural societies sedentism often coincided with hereditary power, for example in the salmon-
rich American Pacific northwest where chiefs commanded tributes and held slaves—though
nonagricultural societies never reach the levels of surplus and differences in power achieved
in agricultural societies [32, 63–65]. Hereditary rule is often resisted, with societies cycling
between periods in which status is hereditary and periods in which such leaders are over-
thrown [32, 33, 65, 66]. But where such rulers do become established they are often able to
command significant resources [35, 67]. Chiefs commanding greater resources and more sol-
diers are typically able to outcompete those with fewer resources and smaller armies [37, 38,
68]; sometimes one chiefdom would achieve decisive victory over its neighbours, and some-
times one such unified kingdom was able to subordinate neighbouring kingdoms to create an
empire [32, 37, 69]. High levels of conflict, evidenced by defensive structures, deadly raids, and
the abandonment of affected farmland suggest that, given the alternatives, there would have
been significant benefits to group membership (b) for even the lowliest member of society
[32, 70]. These defensive benefits may provide benefits to group membership even if these
individuals receive only just enough to eat to survive: Mesopotamian labour records from the
end of the third millennium BC suggest that both coerced labour and unskilled wage labourers
received rations at bare subsistence level [71].
Contracts, growth, and titled property
Whilst a strong literature had suggested that secure ownership affords owners economic
incentives and so drives economic growth [60, 72, 73], it has been noted that secure ownership
has often been present during historical periods where little such growth occurred [74, 75]. An
emerging literature now highlights a particular characteristic of property titles that had been
previously neglected: the ability of owners to use their titles to procure loans [76, 77]. This lit-
erature now suggests that the use of property titles to procure loans drives economic growth
by increasing both the availability of resources for investment and the incentives for seeking
returns, particularly by individuals keen to avoid dispossession by default. Though beginning
as an essentially extractive practice [78], the creation of titles to future resources does ensure
that individuals receive a return on resources they transfer to others, and provides a means for
those without inherited wealth to obtain resources for investment (so ensuring that b> c and
a return to first possession is avoided). However, the relationship between property titles and
economic growth is also hypothesised to be bidirectional [79, 80]: the wider availability of
resources to fund investments provide both the incentives and the means for individuals to
increase their income through loans that can generally be repaid during times of resource
expansion, but periods without expansion have historically been accompanied by instability
caused by social polarisation, and often a return to more directly coercive forms of ownership
[81].
Unlike earlier ownership institutions, the evolution of contractual titles to resource items
can largely be traced through the written historical record; indeed, writing itself likely first
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developed in Mesopotamia around 5500 years ago for the purpose of recording such contracts
[78, 82, 83]. The imprinted clay used to seal shipments became used to record the goods with
which a merchant had been entrusted for sale elsewhere [84] effectively becoming contracts
for the delivery of a specific quantity of resources to be transferred at a specified future time
[78]. Likely a uniquely Mesopotamian innovation, the interest-bearing loan arose once lenders
began to expect a fixed rate of return on these commercial loans [78]. Sumerian rulers [85]
and later wealthy private creditors [86] extended the logic of these commercial agreements
and began to charge a fixed rate of interest on loans to farmers who pledged themselves and
their family to debt bondage in the event of default; labour markets soon emerged as wages
likely became the only means by which the indebted could repay their debts and avoid enslave-
ment [71, 78, 86]. By the end of the 3rd millennium BC, the enslavement of farmers was having
a negative effect on social cohesion, and in the centuries leading up to 1600 BC rulers periodi-
cally proclaimed ‘clean slates’ in which agrarian debts—but not commercial loans—were for-
given and the enslaved allowed to return to their place of origin, reasserting the royal right to
agricultural tributes and overriding the claims of private creditors [85]. However, rulers gradu-
ally lost their power and by the first millennium BC were no longer able to annul the titles
acquired by increasingly wealthy private creditors [33, 78].
Contracts for interest-bearing loans appear in Greece during the eighth century BC, likely
due to the influence of Syrian and Phoenician merchants [87]. Lacking a strong central author-
ity with the ability to cancel debts and redistribute property titles, the arrival of interest soon
led to dispossession, debt peonage, and popular revolts against the ruling oligarchs in cities
across Greece [88]. In Athens, Solon’s 594 BC reforms cancelled all debts and outlawed debt
bondage and dependent labour among Athenians, though unlike the Mesopotamian system
this was a one-off measure and crises soon recurred [89]. Gradually a cycle of oligarchic rule
and revolt gave way to ever more stable political institutions which, though institutionalising
the exclusion of women and of slaves, would include all the male citizenry in decision-making
[90]. Though repeatedly identified by contemporary observers as a source of social tension,
interest charges persisted throughout the Greek classical period [91]. Consistent returns were
made possible by an economy growing between about 0.07 and 0.14 percent per year in the
period 800-300 BC, coinciding with increases in trade across the Mediterranean and territorial
expansion westward: between 750 and 500 BC the area of arable land under Greek control
roughly doubled [90].
The early centuries of the Roman Republic, its beginning traditionally dated to 509 BC,
were similarly characterised by debt crises. Successive legislation was passed to limit interest
and wealth concentration [92–95]. A key innovation was to permit interest charges where the
lender suffers a loss such as through wear and tear, but to prohibit usurious contracts that
charged for merely using a thing where no such loss occurs; charges on consumption loans,
specifically, were classified as usury since the repayment of a quantity of food or drink equal to
that consumed by the borrower was considered full repayment of what had been borrowed
[96, 97]. The Roman success in overcoming internal conflicts, particularly by the third and sec-
ond century BC, translated into success against external enemies, which in turn provided the
material resources to diffuse internal tensions [95, 98]. However, increasing numbers of
indebted small farmers nevertheless lost their farms, and though at first the propertyless prole-
tarii were drawn to one of dozens of new colonies, after 180 BC only one new colony is
reported [94, 99, 100]. The Crisis of the Republic, beginning in 134 BC, was triggered by
attempts to reinstitute laws limiting interest rates and land concentration, leading to the end of
the Republic in a century of civil war that, amongst other things, settled the debt question in
favour of the wealthy creditors [78, 94, 101]. A little over a century later, the Roman Principate
reached its largest territorial extent under the emperor Trajan in 117 AD, but his successors no
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longer pursued a policy of expansion and increasingly debased the coinage to cover expendi-
tures. The Crisis of the Third Century saw the end of the classical period in civil wars, territo-
rial losses, political assassinations, and the widespread return of debt peonage [94, 96].
Keen to avoid such recurring debt crises, the early Christian Fathers prohibited the charg-
ing of usury, particularly drawing on Old Testament texts describing Hebrew practices likely
borrowed from the ancient Mesopotamians [78, 96, 102, 103]. Across Europe serfdom became
widespread, but by the beginning of the second millennium Europe began to emerge from its
prolonged slump, and learning, commerce, and money-lending began to revive [96, 104].
Developing classical thought, debates came to focus on how to distinguish legitimate interest
from illegitimate usury. The Catholic Church gradually permitted interest to be contracted on
a variety of loans, but most were at one time or another abused to disguise usurious charges
[97, 105, 106]. From the fifteenth century, Protestant reformers argued that these prohibitions
should be relaxed; in any case, with the ubiquity of interest-bearing money markets and the
development of ever more complex financial contracts, by the eighteenth century the Catholic
Church would effectively concede that the distinction between interest and usury was no lon-
ger within their capacity to legislate [97].
Beginning in western Europe, the modern period saw the gradual relaxation of laws restrict-
ing the kinds of contract that could be entered into for the transfer of resources. Among the
earliest, England’s post-Reformation pro-creditor laws in 1543 and 1545 legislated for the
imprisonment and dispossession of defaulters and effectively decriminalised all loan contracts
that charged interest at less than ten per cent [107, 108]. As in classical times, the reinstitution
of titled property institutions were accompanied by internal tensions mitigated by external
expansion. English territories grew from the smallest they had been for hundreds of years
through the complete recolonisation of Ireland by 1603, and in successive centuries the found-
ing of colonies across the world from which resources were acquired and to which millions of
people migrated or were transported; by 1925 the British empire covered almost a quarter of
the Earth’s total land area [109, 110].
The continuing evolution of ownership
Unlike earlier periods, the resource base of modern economies has continued expanding not
only territorially but also through the use of vast reserves of fossil fuel energy, first from coal,
then later increasing inputs of oil and natural gas [111, 112]. In England, by the mid-sixteenth
century, rising demand for coal coincided with the localised depletion of woodland close to
urban centres [113, 114]. Between 1550 and 1700, English coal output increased twelve-fold
[115]. By the start of the nineteenth century coal-driven steam engines were sufficiently fuel
efficient that they could for the first time be located away from a coal mine [116], including in
countries where their use had previously been impossible, and to power the steam ships plying
the long trade routes of the British Empire [117]. Globally, per capita energy consumption
continues to increase [118], and unprecedentedly large urban populations are now sustained
by food and fuel brought into cities using transports themselves powered largely by fossil fuels
[119].
Since the late twentieth century, however, global energy growth has begun to slow [120].
The energy return from extracting fossil fuels has undergone a steady decline as higher quality
resources have become depleted, leading to the exploitation of ever lower quality fuels that
require ever more energy to obtain and refine [120]. Nor are nuclear fuels the panacea they
once appeared, since the mining, enrichment, conversion, and disposal processes involved in
nuclear technologies are themselves heavily dependent on fossil fuels and relatively scarce min-
erals for reactor construction. Moreover, the quality of available nuclear ore is itself declining,
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with high grade ore predicted to become rapidly depleted in the next few decades [120–122].
Renewable sources, though not susceptible to depletion, have their limits. Direct solar radia-
tion is the only renewable resource that has the physical potential to surpass the amount of
energy currently provided by fossil fuels, but the land that can be used to support photovoltaic
generation without directly competing with food production is limited. Estimates suggest that
unrealistically large amounts of land would be required for renewables to substitute for even
15 to 30 percent of current fuel use [116, 123].
Whilst titled property institutions have historically survived as long as resource transfers
can be motivated by the promise of increased returns, in the absence of expansion the motiva-
tion to transfer resources through the promise of increased returns declines. The analysis pre-
sented here suggests that, in past societies, this has often led to social polarisation and a return
to more directly coercive ownership forms. A better understanding of the evolution of our cur-
rent ownership institutions seems increasingly important as our own society approaches ever
more significant constraints [11, 79, 80].
Discussion
Situating the model within the existing literature
The model here differs from others in the literature in that it seeks to examine the evolution
among human societies of communal, command, and titled property institutions, characteris-
ing these forms of ownership as institutions that govern the transfer of resource items. It there-
fore differs from the existing literature in six key ways.
First, I have here characterised communal, command, and titled property ownership insti-
tutions as rules governing the transfer of resource items. This characterisation therefore differs
from an oft used typology within the social science literature that classifies private, public,
common, and club ownership in terms of excludability and rivalry [124]. The conceptualisa-
tion of ownership as transfer rules, as used in this paper, therefore represents a complementary
but distinct way of thinking about ownership, in terms of how items are either retained or
transferred according to communal, command, or titled property rules.
Second, the evolutionary model here is constructed in contrast to an economic literature in
which human ownership institutions are viewed as the result of when the marginal costs of
asserting ownership are exceeded by the marginal benefits of reducing externalities, so that a
mutual respect for the possessions of others reduces the costs of fighting required to defend
those possessions [125, 126]. Though papers in this tradition often talk in terms of the ‘evolu-
tion’ of these institutions, [127–129] the term is used loosely to mean merely ‘change’ and
there is little discussion of how processes of variation, selection, and retention might actually
bring about the many different forms that ownership takes [130].
Third, the existing evolutionary game theory modelling literature has focussed on the varia-
tion, selection, and retention of behaviours as they evolved in cellular and chromosomal pro-
cesses and nonhuman animals, and have not yet been extended to examine the ownership
institutions of humans that are my focus here [2, 7, 131–134]. Moreover, these existing models
aim to explain similarities across this wide range of processes independent of their different
ecological circumstances [7]. In contrast, I am here examining the reasons for differences in
the ownership institutions that govern different types of resource, and so I focus not on the
similarities but on the different acquisition and retention strategies in different resource set-
tings, providing a heuristic for examining how these different institutions have emerged and
survived. Relatedly, unlike other economic and biological models [131, 135–137], the model in
this paper is not intended as an account of the mechanisms by which some form of ownership
might prevent a ‘tragedy of unmanaged commons’ from occurring. However, though the
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model here is itself silent upon the important question of whether ownership may limit the
appropriation of items from a depletable resource stock, it is worth noting that the analysis
that emerges does seem to suggest that the depletion of resources may occur under all four
ownership institutions here modelled, to some extent reflecting empirical findings that owner-
ship often fails to prevent resource depletion [138].
Fourth, given this focus on human institutions, the model in this paper builds upon the
observation that under the communal, command, and titled property ownership characteristic
of human societies, resource items are typically not retained by their first possessor but are
transferred to others. This differs from Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois type models that aim to provide
an account of the conventions observed in nonhumans by which the first possessor of a
resource tends to retain possession of a resource. Variants include the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois-
Assessor model whereby disputes over possession are settled according to assessments about
the rate of expenditure of a fitness budget during a fight [139], the ‘competitive collusion’ mod-
els in which the first individuals to arrive collude to prevent the establishment of further com-
petitors [140], and the ‘nagging neighbour’ models in which territorial arrangements are
determined through aggressive interactions [141]. However, it is oft remarked that Hawk-
Dove-Bourgeois type models cannot explain the absence of an ‘anti-bourgeois’ convention in
which existing possessors surrender their possessions to newcomers [7], and nor can such
models explain the emergence of the non-possessive institutions typical of human groups. For
clarity, the model presented here is not intended to downplay the role that prior possession
plays in underpinning several human ownership institutions, for example where possession is
used to stake an ownership claim to unowned resources as diverse as wild animals, abandoned
treasure, and deep sea minerals [142]; in this regard, it is worth noting that the model preserves
the way in which a prior possession convention continues to play a role in the emergence of
the non-possessive institutional outcomes, since the benefits of retention or transfer can only
accrue to those individuals who have made an effort to acquire an item in the first place. Nev-
ertheless, among humans, most of the objects that people own have not been acquired by
themselves, but by somebody else. The purpose of this paper has therefore been, not to down-
play the role of prior possession rules, but to try to better understand the evolution of the rules
that govern resource transfers.
Fifth, one further reason that both economic and Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois type models have
tended to neglect the difference between animal possessiveness and the non-possessiveness
characteristic of humans is that those literatures have largely focussed on the ownership of ter-
ritory, rather than on the rules governing the ownership of resource items. With my focus on
modelling resource transfers, I have distinguished ownership of territory from ownership of
resource items, focussing on the ownership of resource items in order to better understand the
rules governing their transfer and retention. Since my focus is on humans, this is an approach
consistent with those within the anthropological tradition who focus less on the presence or
absence of territorial boundaries, and more on the ownership rules that govern the ownership
of resource items [143].
Sixth, the model allows the possibility that there may be a net benefit for an individual to
transfer a resource item. This is in contrast to Producer-Scrounger models [144–146] which
are constructed to examine the behaviour of group foragers by explaining the composition of a
mixed population of Producers who try to obtain new resources and Scroungers who attempt
to obtain existing resources from those Producers. As in the model here, Producer-Scrounger
models focus on resource items and on the circumstances in which resources are transferred,
and predict that a mix of Producers and Scroungers can be evolutionarily stable (similar to the
Demander-Transferrer populations here), whilst a population composed of large numbers of
Scroungers would likely force the group to dissolve (similar to the Demander dominated
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populations here). However, the focus of Producer-Scrounger models is still on explaining ani-
mal behaviours, specifically the scrounging patterns observed amongst social foragers such as
primates and birds, and so though these models provide much more realistic and precise anal-
yses of scrounging among social foragers than is possible in the more general model here,
those models are not suitable for the examination of the evolution of ownership institutions
among humans. Most specifically, producer-scrounger theories assume that scrounging
reduces producer fitness, an assumption that has been noted as a possible limitation even in
theorising social forager behaviour, since primate food-calling behaviour may increase the net
fitness of the food-caller despite apparently encouraging scrounging [145]. Unlike Producer-
Scrounger models, then, the model presented here explicitly allows resource transfers to
increase the net fitness of agents, and thereby permits of the possibility that such benefits may
play a role in evolution of human ownership institutions.
Model limitations
Scientific models cannot simultaneously maximise generality, realism, and precision [143].
Since I use the model to examine a broad range of institutions, in this paper I have tended to
privilege generality over realism, and to a lesser extent realism over precision. As a result, the
model’s chief limitations are due to its simplicity, the high level of abstraction due to the use of
‘fitness’ as the variable unit measure, and the simplification of the passage of time.
The first limitation, that the model is simplistic, results from its focus on just five variables
that place the analytical focus on intra-group interactions. As a result, the model neglects
more complicated multi-level effects such as inter-group interactions like warfare, which are
included in the model only to the extent that such activities impact upon the costs and benefits
of interactions within the group, though group selection effects are widely thought to influence
learned behaviours [12, 13]. Similarly, for simplicity, the model neglects policing [131] and the
enforcement of policing [12] in populations of non-related individuals. Also neglected are
costs and benefits of relatively small magnitude, such as the costs of moving between opportu-
nities to play Demand [145], which are assumed to be negligible in comparison to the other
variables included in the model.
The second limitation is that the model is abstract since it uses ‘fitness’ as the unit measure
of the model variables. Standard practice in evolutionary modelling, such abstraction is very
useful for producing a highly generalisable model, though it relegates much of the work of pre-
cision to the interpretative stage. In the case of the model presented here, four of the five vari-
ables are defined in terms of the increases or decreases they bring about in an individual’s
fitness, and the fifth (P) is used only as a factor of one of the other four (v). The relationship
between the variables is therefore expressed in terms of the relative values of fitness increases
and decreases. This implies that resources are treated as inherently continuous, an assumption
that is nevertheless reasonably realistic for my purposes, since the resources that are the focus
are foraged foods, large game, agricultural yields, and fuels—all resources that are in principle
indefinitely divisible. A related consequence of the use of an abstract ‘fitness’ unit as the model
measure is that a given cost or benefit is defined in quite an aggregated manner. As such, it is
not possible within the model to recreate the specific actions of individuals in particular cir-
cumstances, for which a finer-grained model would be required. As an illustrative example,
the model cannot describe in detail the events that occur during a specific hunt should a num-
ber of individuals forego their foraging activities to pursue some larger prey, incurring costs in
the pursuit and then attempting to obtain shares of the kill [27, 29, 30]. At the level of abstrac-
tion at which the model here operates, the best approximation of such events is one where, for
a given increase in an individual’s fitness due to obtaining a resource through either their own
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or another’s kill, that individual must engage in activities which reduces their fitness by some
proportional amount, with such activities taken to include all the unsuccessful hunts which
they have joined. Despite this limitation of abstraction, in at least one important respect the
model here nicely illustrates a key characteristic of human hunter-gatherer behaviour, since
the distribution of meat in hunter-gatherer societies typically does not take place only amongst
the individuals present at the kill, but amongst members of the community more widely. This
is a distinguishing feature of communal ownership: that distribution occurs irrespective of any
individual efforts made to join a hunt or to be in the vicinity of a kill.
The third broad limitation of the model is that the passage of time is modelled only in the
transition from one generation of the population to the next, so all costs and benefits must be
modelled as occurring as an instantaneous outcome from each interaction with payoffs that
influence the population structure of the next generation of the game. Though it is intuitive to
imagine that the costs and benefits of acquiring and of fighting to obtain or retain a resource
are more or less immediate, the varied and diffuse benefits that may derive from transferring a
resource are less intuitive to model as immediately occurring. Combined with the abstract
nature of ‘fitness’, this means that some interpretative work is required to disambiguate the dif-
ferent ways in which fitness may be increased by transferring a resource of a particular value.
Nevertheless, this modelling limitation is useful in illuminating the nature of the benefits that
may be involved, since it highlights the problem that the benefits of transferring resources is
not usually instantaneous in actual human societies. Broadly, the kinds of benefits to transfer-
ring are conceptualised here as those that derive from group membership, and though there
may in reality be diverse costs and benefits involved in the addition of group members [147],
for simplicity such benefits are here modelled as essentially costless to existing members. So,
for example, a successful hunter who transfers food to others increases their own fitness by
increasing the likelihood that other members of the group will survive, thereby increasing the
extent to which a larger, better fed group will provide greater group defence and reduce vari-
ance in the future food supply. Though these benefits of transferring are diffuse and project
into the future, it is worth noting that those who transfer resources under each of the owner-
ship institutions often do immediately receive some form of assurance that they can expect
some future benefits: hunters who share generously may gain prestige; peasants may be reas-
sured that they will receive protection from expulsion and future attack; and parties to a con-
tract are legally assured that they will be paid what they have contracted. Future work may
usefully examine the similarities and differences between these different assurance mecha-
nisms as they operate under these different institutions.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented and interpreted a simple model for the continuing evolution of
ownership among humans. Departing from existing models of possessive behaviours among
nonhuman animals, the model provides a heuristic for examining the evolution of communal,
command, and titled property institutions prevalent in human societies as institutions govern-
ing the transfer of resource items. Using the model to interpret existing evidence on the emer-
gence and persistence of these forms of ownership suggests that each of these particular
institutions is more likely to survive to govern particular types of resource. Specifically: com-
munal ownership is adaptive among large game hunters once better hunting tools increase
both the costs of fighting between group members and the defensive and variance reducing
benefits of sustaining other members in the group; command ownership emerges after the
decline of large game, when alternative resources become more easily monopolised by those
with an increased ability to win conflicts and where outside conditions are such that even the
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lowliest member of society receives sufficient benefit upon the surrender of resources to those
in command; and titled property becomes adaptive when written contracts provides a new
means for individuals to ensure that they receive a benefit from making transfers. This analysis
suggests that titled property institutions have historically declined when governing resources
that are no longer expanding, and that such institutions may again come under pressure
should future resources become significantly constrained.
Method
The Demander-Resister-Transferrer model
The three strategies can be expressed in terms of the five parameter variables as follows (see
Table 2 for the list of symbols):
• Demand (D): demands a resource of value v from the other player. If the other player resists
then there is a fight where D incurs a cost f. Demand wins the fight a proportion P of the
time and gains v when it wins.
• Resist (R): Obtains a resource of value v at a cost c. Incurs a cost f if fought by a Demander;
wins the fight and retains the resource 1 − P of the time.
• Transfer (T): Obtains a resource of value v at a cost c. Transfers the resource if demanded by
a Demander with neither Transferrer nor Demander suffering any cost of fighting, and
some additional benefit b may be gained by the Transferrer.
Different values for these five variables leads to different mixes of strategies in the popula-
tion. These are represented by the proportion p in a population that adopts Demand, the pro-
portion q that adopts Resist, and the proportion 1 − p − q that adopts Transfer. V(X|Y) denotes
the increase in fitness that results from an interaction between some strategy X and some strat-
egy Y, and W(X) denotes the average change in fitness across all of some strategy X’s interac-
tions, which in turn depends upon the proportion of each of the other strategies in the
population. The outcome of each interaction can therefore be listed as:
VðDjDÞ ¼ 0 VðRjDÞ ¼ ð1   PÞv   f   c VðTjDÞ ¼ b   c
VðDjRÞ ¼ Pv   f VðRjRÞ ¼ v   c VðTjRÞ ¼ v   c
VðDjTÞ ¼ v VðRjTÞ ¼ v   c VðTjTÞ ¼ v   c
Table 2. List of symbols.
D The Demander strategy.
R The Resister strategy.
T The Transferrer strategy.
v Value of the resource obtained by the individual.
c Cost of obtaining that resource from the environment; 0 < c.
f Cost of conflict (‘fighting’) over the resource; 0 < f.
b Benefit of transferring the resource.
P Proportion of conflicts won by a Demander; 0� P � 1.
p Proportion of D in the population.
q Proportion of R in the population.
1 − p − q Proportion of T in the population.
V(X|Y) The change in fitness of X when X interacts with Y.
W(X) The average change in fitness across all of X’s interactions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211871.t002
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and the average change in fitness across each of the three strategies listed as:
WðDÞ ¼ pVðDjDÞ þ qVðDjRÞ þ ð1   p   qÞðDjTÞ
s ¼ qðPv   f Þ þ ð1   p   qÞv
ð1Þ
WðRÞ ¼ pVðRjDÞ þ qVðRjRÞ þ ð1   p   qÞVðRjTÞ
¼ vð1   pPÞ   pf   c
ð2Þ
WðTÞ ¼ pVðTjDÞ þ qVðTjRÞ þ ð1   p   qÞVðTjTÞ
¼ ð1   pÞvþ pb   c:
ð3Þ
The replicator dynamic is used to calculate the strategy mix in a population based upon the
proportions in the preceding population and the relative fitness of the strategies. For the sake
of argument, the model uses the standard replicator dynamic [14]. For a two strategy game
between Demanders and Transferrers, for example, where p0 denotes the proportion of D in
the succeeding population, this dynamic is:
p0 ¼
pVðDÞ
pVðDÞ þ ð1   pÞVðTÞ
ð4Þ
from which the difference equation can be derived [14]:
Dp ¼ pð1   pÞ
WðDÞ   WðTÞ
pWðDÞ   ð1   pÞWðTÞ
: ð5Þ
Strategies are evolutionarily stable when either one strategy dominates, or there is coexis-
tence between two or more strategies. Within the model parameters of our model, only three
outcomes are stable: domination by Demanders, domination by Resisters, or Demander-
Transferrer coexistence.
Transferrers cannot dominate the other two strategies, since when they meet Resisters their
payoffs are equal, and they would only always be fitter in their interactions with Demanders if
both −c + b> 0 and v − c> v, yet the second of these cannot hold, since c> 0. Demanders can
dominate: they will be fitter across all interactions with Resisters if 0> (1 − P)v − f − c holds
(as well as whenever 0> (1 − P)v + f − c which, since f> 0, holds whenever the first inequality
holds); they will also be fitter across all interactions with Transferrers if c> b (and whenever
v> v − c, which always holds since c> 0). Correspondingly, Resisters can dominate Demand-
ers when (1 − P)v − f − c> 0 (and when (1 − P)v + f − c> 0 which, since f> 0, holds whenever
the first inequality holds), and in interactions with Transferrers will be equally fit since Resister
and Transferrer payoffs are equal.
If 0> (1 − P)v − f − c and b> c then no strategy will dominate, but a mixed population will
result. In a coexisting Resister-Transferrer population the payoffs between the two strategies
are equal, so its ability to repel Demanders depends upon the proportions of the mix, that is,
whether there is a sufficient proportion of Resisters in the population to repel Demanders.
Demander-Transferrer coexistence is possible where v> v − c and b> c (but not the
reverse, since c> 0). A Demander-Transferrer population can repel Resisters when both
are fitter than invading Resisters. To find where this occurs, we first find the Demander-
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Transferrer equilibrium point p^ (remembering that q = 0):
WðDÞ ¼WðTÞ





We then find the conditions where at this equilibrium point, W(D) = W(T)>W(R):
WðDÞ >WðRÞ
ð1   p^Þv > vð1   p^PÞ   p^f   c
c
vð1   PÞ   f
> p^:
ð7Þ
Substituting p^ with cb, simplifying, and solving for zero:
c




0 > ð1   PÞv   f   b:
ð8Þ
This inequality holds whenever 0> (1 − P)v − f − c and b> c. So, when 0> (1 − P)v − f − c
and b> c, a Demander-Transferrer population coexists and repels Resisters.
A coexisting Demander-Resister population is not possible. Using the same process as
above, the equilibrium point of a coexisting Demander-Resister population would be
qðPv  f Þ  vþc
  vP  f ¼ p^, and that population could repel Transferrers if p ¼
qðPv  f Þ  vþc
  vP  f and W(D)>W(T).
However, estimating that inequality and substituting
qðPv  f Þ  vþc
  vP  f for p simplifies to the inequality
(1 − P)v − f − b> 0; since 0> (1 − P)v − f − c and c> b, this outcome is not possible.
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